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THE SCOPE OF POLICE QUESTIONING
DURING A ROUTINE TRAFFIC STOP:
DO QUESTIONS OUTSIDE THE
SCOPE OF THE ORIGINAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STOP CREATE
IMPERMISSIBLE SEIZURES IF THEY DO NOT
PROLONG THE STOP?
Bill Lawrence*
INTRODUCTION
A police officer makes a routine traffic stop of a vehicle with a
cracked windshield.' He questions the driver about the windshield
and asks for the driver's license and registration.2 While the officer
checks the documentation, he asks the driver whether he has any
illegal narcotics in the car.' The driver says 'no,' and the officer
asks for consent to search the vehicle.4 After the driver consents,
the officer discovers cocaine on the driver's side of the car.5
In the prosecution for the possession of cocaine, the defendant
argues that his consent was tainted by the officer's question about
illegal narcotics because it was outside the scope of the original
justification for the stop-the cracked windshield.6 The defendant
claims that the officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights7 be-
cause the question about illegal narcotics gave rise to an unreason-
able seizure. 8 A court agrees and rules that the consent was invalid
and that the evidence must be suppressed.9
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004; B.A., Communica-
tion, Villanova University, 2000. I would like to thank my family and friends for their
love and support. I also sincerely thank Professor Daniel Richman for his valuable
insights.
1. This fact pattern is based on the facts from United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d
947 (7th Cir. 2002).
2. See Childs, 277 F.3d at 949-50.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. See Childs, 277 F.3d at 947-50.
9. Id.
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The situation described above occurs frequently, with many
courts ruling similarly to this one. 10 Accordingly, the issue this
Note addresses is whether a police officer, during a routine traffic
stop, violates a person's Fourth Amendment rights when the of-
ficer's questions stray from the original reason for the stop. Reso-
lution of the issue pits privacy concerns against the state's interest
in effective law enforcement. 1 With circuits split over the issue,
12
and the Supreme Court not yet plainly ruling on it, 3 this Note aims
to provide a narrow solution to the problem.
Part I of this Note explains the Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness standard and discusses the line of Supreme Court cases from
Terry v. Ohio14 to Florida v. Bostick 5 that deal with the permissible
scope of questioning during a stop. Part II introduces the split be-
tween the Fifth and Seventh Circuits and the Eighth, Ninth, and,
Tenth Circuits, highlighting the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in
United States v. Childs. 6 Further, Part II discusses the balance be-
tween privacy concerns and effective law enforcement and shows
that the arguments are important because the Supreme Court has
not yet directly ruled on the issue." Part III of this Note proposes
that courts consider the narrow holding in Childs. This Note con-
cludes that in the routine traffic stop situation, effective police
work outweighs the minimal privacy interest.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160 (8th Cir.
1994); United States v. Rodriguez-Diaz, 161 F. Supp. 2d 627 (D. Md. 2001); United
States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558 (D. Utah 1994). See generally U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Security, THE QUARTERLY REVIEW ARTICLES 4 (describing an in-depth hypothetical
situation that closely mirrors the introductory situation in an article about Terry stops
for law enforcement officials), available at http://www.fletc.gov/legal/articles.pdf; Ron-
ald Menaker, Sloppy Police Work Undermines Drug Prosecution, CHICAGO DAILY
BULLETIN, Jan. 8, 2003, at 9 (describing case where officers exceeded Terry scope
limitation and transformed a valid stop into an illegal arrest).
11. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (analyzing the balance be-
tween privacy concerns and the public interest). See generally Robert Whorf, Consent
Searches Following Routine Traffic Stops: The Troubled Jurisprudence of a Doomed
Drug Interdiction Technique, 28 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2001) (discussing privacy
concerns).
12. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have taken a different position on the issue
than the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See infra Part II.
13. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 36 (1996).
14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
15. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
16. 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002).
17. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 36.
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1. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS STANDARD
The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."'1 8 To trigger
the protection of the amendment, an officer must commit an un-
reasonable search or seizure. 19 Problems arise, however, in deter-
mining whether an unreasonable search or seizure has occurred. 20
This Note centers on the seizure component within the context of a
routine traffic stop.
Put simply, a seizure occurs if a police officer causes a reasona-
ble person to feel as though he cannot walk away or terminate the
encounter. 21 Within this definition, a routine traffic stop of a mo-
tor vehicle constitutes a limited seizure and may trigger the Terry
doctrine.22 Under the Terry doctrine, an officer may stop a suspect
and detain her briefly to investigate reasonable suspicion of crimi-
nal activity.23 Because the Terry doctrine may apply to motor vehi-
cle stops as well, if, as in the introductory situation, a driver
commits a traffic violation, a police officer may stop the driver for
as long as it takes to write a ticket for the violation.24 Moreover,
the Terry doctrine provides that in determining whether a search or
seizure was unreasonable, courts consider whether the original rea-
son for the officer's actions was justifiable and whether it was rea-
sonably related in scope to the original circumstances. 25
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
20. See id.
21. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); see also Terry, 392
U.S. at 16 ("It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.").
22. See United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he analyti-
cal framework set forth in Terry v. Ohio applies to traffic stops." (citation omitted)).
23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-24.
24. United States v. Daniel, 804 F. Supp. 1330, 1334 (D. Nev. 1992) (holding that a
traffic stop constitutes a limited seizure and falls within the "purview" of Terry). In
fact, many vehicle stops are performed on the basis of probable cause that a traffic
violation has occurred. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808-09 (1996)
(involving probable cause of traffic violation when suspect failed to use turning sig-
nal); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding probable cause
of traffic violation of driving with a cracked windshield); United States v. Murillo, 255
F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding probable cause for tailgating violation);
United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1161 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding probable cause for
traffic violation based on seat belt violation). Although probable cause of a traffic
violation supports most traffic stops, courts generally analyze the stops under Terry.
See Holt, 264 F.3d at 1217 (applying Terry framework to traffic stop).
25. Terry, 392 U.S. at 18-19.
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Issues arise when, during routine traffic stops, officers ask ques-
tions unrelated to the original reason for the stop.26 Some courts
hold that for an officer to justify questioning beyond the original
reason for the stop, there must be reasonable suspicion of indepen-
dent, criminal activity.27 Other courts hold that officers may be
justified asking questions outside the scope of the original reason
for the stop so long as the questions do not prolong the stop.28
Thus, the issue apparently turns on the length of the detention for
some courts, while other courts take a bright-line approach and
ban the questioning altogether.
Presented with the introductory scenario, then, a court must de-
termine whether the officer committed an unreasonable seizure or
if he simply asked a question.29 To aid in this endeavor, a court
may consider a line of cases that deals with general police
questioning.30
In a non-custodial situation, a police officer may ask questions or
request consent to search so long as the officer does not imply that
the answers or consent are obligatory.31 Moreover, reasonable sus-
picion is not a prerequisite to these questions. 2 For example, the
Bostick court noted, "[A] seizure does not occur simply because a
police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions. ' 33
Along these lines, police officers may ask questions as long as they
do not employ coercive tactics.34 If an officer employs coercive
26. E.g., Childs, 277 F.3d at 947-50; Murillo, 255 F.3d at 1169-72; Holt, 264 F.3d at
1215-21; Ramos, 42 F.3d at 1160-62.
27. E.g., Murillo, 255 F.3d at 1174; Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220-21; Ramos, 42 F.3d at
1163-64.
28. Childs, 277 F.3d at 954; United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir.
1993).
29. Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 436.
30. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); United States v. Bostick,
501 U.S 429 (1991); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
31. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216-17 ("But if the person refuses to answer and the
police take additional steps-such as those taken in Brown-to obtain an answer,
then the Fourth Amendment imposes some minimal level of objective justification to
validate the detention or seizure.").
32. Bostick, 501 U.S at 434.
33. Id. at 434.
34. Id. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court alluded to the difference between
police questioning and seizures, noting that "[o]bviously, not all personal intercourse
between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the lib-
erty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16
(1968).
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tactics, however, the questions may give rise to an unreasonable
seizure.
Under this analysis, a police officer may ask questions freely of
persons walking down the street.36 Bostick makes this point.37 In
Bostick, police officers boarded a passenger bus for drug interdic-
tion purposes. 38 After informing a passenger of their purpose on
the bus and then questioning him, the passenger consented to a
search of his bag.39 The search produced narcotics.4n At the trial,
the defendant moved to suppress the narcotics evidence on
grounds that the officer impermissibly seized him.41
The defendant argued that he was seized because after the police
questioning, a reasonable person in his situation would not have
felt free to leave. 2 The Florida Supreme Court ruled in the defen-
dant's favor and adopted a per se rule that essentially, "police in
Florida, as elsewhere, may approach persons at random in most
public places, ask them questions and seek consent to a search, but
they may not engage in the same behavior on a bus."4 3
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that mere
police questioning does not always constitute an impermissible
seizure:
[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter consti-
tutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances sur-
rounding the encounter to determine whether the police
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that
the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or other-
wise terminate the encounter. That rule applies to encounters
that take place on a city street or in an airport lobby, and it
applies equally to encounters on a bus. The Florida Supreme
Court erred in adopting a per se rule."
Although the defendant was not technically free to leave because
he did not want to risk the bus leaving without him, the Court still
said that the officer did not commit an unreasonable seizure.45 The
35. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
36. Cf. United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 2002); Bostick, 501 U.S.
at 439-40.
37. 501 U.S. at 439-40.
38. Id. at 431.
39. Id. at 431-32.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 433.
43. Id. (citation omitted) (summarizing the lower court's holding).
44. Id. at 439-40.
45. Id. at 436.
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Court reasoned that the bright-line "free to leave" doctrine was
inappropriate under these circumstances.46
The Bostick analysis of questions applies to non-traffic stop set-
tings as well. Under United States v. Laboy, the Tenth Circuit
plainly followed Bostick for a sidewalk encounter.47 The defendant
was walking down a sidewalk, across the street from where officers
were conducting an undercover narcotics operation.48 One of the
officers motioned for the defendant to cross the street.49 The of-
ficer asked the defendant if he had any drugs on him and the de-
fendant said yes.-" The officer then arrested the defendant.5
At trial, the district court granted the defendant's motion to sup-
press the evidence seized incident to the arrest, holding that rea-
sonable suspicion did not support the seizure, which rendered it
impermissible. 2 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed,
however, relying heavily on Bostick for its conclusion, "As long as
a reasonable innocent person, as opposed to a person knowingly
carrying contraband, would feel free to leave, such encounters are
consensual and need not be supported by reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. ' 53 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit reversed the
district court's suppression order, holding that the officer's initial
questioning did not create an impermissible seizure. 4
Similarly, the Southern District of Indiana determined that po-
lice questioning outside the traffic stop setting failed to create an
impermissible seizure. In United States v. Steele, officers spotted
the defendant outside a building where a string of burglaries had
recently occurred. 6 One officer walked over to the defendant and
asked him a few questions, including one about the pouch he was
wearing. The defendant voluntarily opened the pouch and the
officer then observed a handgun.5 8 The officer arrested the defen-
46. Id.
47. 979 F.2d 795, 798 (10th Cir. 1992).
48. Id. at 797-800.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 797-98.
51. Id. at 798.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 800.
55. See United States v. Steele, 782 F. Supp. 1301, 1313 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
56. Id. at 1303-04.
57. Id. at 1304.
58. Id.
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dant, who then moved to suppress the evidence on grounds that it
was the product of an impermissible seizure.59
The district court denied the motion to suppress. Citing Bostick,
the court stated, "a court must consider all the circumstances sur-
rounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct
would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person
was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate
the encounter. '60 The court went on to determine that questioning
a person after the conclusion of an investigative stop still may be
deemed consensual.6 Following this reasoning, the court held the
questioning did not create an impermissible seizure and the court
therefore denied the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence.62
And so, Bostick makes plain that in a non-custodial setting, po-
lice questioning does not necessarily equal an impermissible
seizure, even though the person subjectively may not feel free to
leave.63 Thus, in discarding the per se "free to leave" doctrine, a
Bostick analysis considers the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the police questioning and looks to whether a reasonable
person would feel free to decline the questioning. 64
A. The Bostick Analysis Applied To A Routine Traffic Stop
The issue becomes somewhat more complicated in the context of
a custodial routine traffic stop. 5 Some courts have extended the
Bostick reasoning to determine that a routine traffic stop is similar
to the bus setting; that is, the person technically may not feel free
59. Id. at 1304-05.
60. Id. at 1309 (quoting United States v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991)).
61. Id. at 1310 (noting that "even after an investigative stop (a seizure) has con-
cluded, an officer's continued questioning of a person may be consensual if a reasona-
ble person would no longer have felt detained.").
62. Id. at 1313.
63. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439-40. The Supreme Court later affirmed Bostick in
United States v. Drayton, holding:
Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the
street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are
willing to listen. Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for sus-
pecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identifica-
tion, and request consent to search luggage-provided they do not induce
cooperation by coercive means. If a reasonable person would feel free to
terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.
536 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2002) (citations omitted).
64. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439-40.
65. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2002).
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to leave under the circumstances, but the option to decline answer-
ing an officer's question always remains.66 Other courts view the
circumstances differently and employ a strict Terry analysis to de-
termine whether questioning outside the scope creates an unrea-
sonable seizure. 67 The Terry analysis is more restrictive than the
Bostick analysis, however, because it requires a scope limitation. 68
Accordingly, questions analyzed under Terry must fall within the
scope of the original reason for the stop. 69 On the other hand, a
Bostick analysis considers whether a reasonable person would feel
free to decline the questioning.7 °
Opponents of the Bostick analysis, in the routine traffic stop set-
ting, argue that Bostick created his own "sense of restraint" with
his decision to travel by bus.71 By contrast, in situations similar to
that in the introduction, they argue that police conduct creates the
"sense of restraint. ' 72 Bostick, therefore, is distinguishable from
routine traffic stop cases.73
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE SUPREME COURT STANCE
The issue this Note addresses emerges from the internal debate
among the en banc judges of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Childs.74 Here, police officer James Chiola stopped a vehicle
because it had a severely cracked windshield. Passenger Tommie
Childs's obvious nervousness struck Chiola as strange.76 Childs's
nervousness led Chiola to stray from questions about the wind-
shield to questions about drugs.77 The issue before the court was
whether Chiola exceeded the permissible scope of questioning and
thereby created an impermissible seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.78
66. See, e.g., id. at 950-52; United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir.
1993).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 1994).
68. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1968).
69. Id.
70. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991).
71. See Whorf, supra note 11, at 15.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2002).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 949-50.
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The Seventh Circuit held that an officer may question freely as
long as the additional questions do not detain a person longer than
necessary to investigate the original reason for the stop.7 9 Under
this view, police questioning outside the scope of the original rea-
son for the stop does not create an unreasonable seizure unless it
actually prolongs the stop.80
In contrast, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that
questioning must fall within the scope of the original justification
for the stop, unless the officer discovers circumstances giving rise
to an independent justification for questions outside that scope.81
Otherwise, the questioning may create an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.82
This circuit split focuses on the tension between effective police
work and Fourth Amendment rights.83 The full facts of Childs pre-
sent a clear picture of this tension. Because this circuit split more
directly addresses this Note's issue, it receives primary considera-
tion over the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Robinette,84
which does not directly address the issue.85
A. The Seventh Circuit and Childs
Officer Chiola had stopped Childs three days prior to the stop in
question.86 During that stop, a check revealed that Childs was
wanted on an outstanding warrant, and his possession of marijuana
added a drug offense to that charge.87 Chiola noted that Childs's
windshield was cracked, but did not issue a citation for the of-
fense.88 Nevertheless, he told Childs to fix the problem.89
79. Id. at 954.
80. Id. at 953-54.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ra-
mos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 1994).
82. See, e.g., Murillo, 255 F.3d at 1174-75; Holt, 264 F.3d at 1220-21; Ramos, 42
F.3d at 1163.
83. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1968); Whorf, supra note 11.
84. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
85. In Robinette, the Supreme Court focused on whether an officer should be re-
quired to tell a detained motorist he was free to leave before asking further questions.
Id. at 39-40. This Note, however, addresses whether questions unrelated to the initial
reason for a routine traffic stop that do not prolong the stop create an impermissible
seizure. Therefore, because the following circuit cases address this Note's issue more
directly, they garner its initial focus.
86. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 949 (7th Cir. 2002).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
1927
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Three days later, Chiola saw the same car with the windshield
still broken and he pulled it over again. 90 This time, however,
Childs, who had been released on bail, was a passenger in the car
and was not wearing his seatbelt. 91 While his partner performed a
license and registration check, Chiola asked Childs three questions:
1) why he had not fixed the windshield; 2) whether he had any
marijuana on him; and 3) whether he would consent to a search of
the vehicle.92
Childs consented to the search and Chiola discovered crack-co-
caine in the vehicle, which led to prosecution for possession with
intent to distribute.93 The court was left to determine whether Chi-
ola's second question about the marijuana created an unreasonable
seizure of Childs because the traffic stop was unrelated to drugs.94
Analyzing the situation, the majority noted the definitional
problems of branding Chiola's marijuana question as an impermis-
sible seizure under the Fourth Amendment, simply because Childs
was in custody:
[T]he Supreme Court has held repeatedly that police may ap-
proach persons and ask questions or seek their permission to
search, provided that the officers do not imply that answers or
consent are obligatory.
Are things different when the suspect is in formal custody? It is
difficult to see why custody should turn an inquiry into a
'seizure.' Posing a question still does not meet the Supreme
Court's definition of a seizure. Officer Chiola did not restrain
Childs's liberty (or increase the severity of the existing restraint)
by asking something that Childs could refuse to answer.95
The majority determined that because Chiola's question did not
prolong the stop and because it was an effective means of police
strategy, Chiola's question, although unrelated to the original justi-
fication for the stop, did not make Childs's seizure unreasonable. 96
The court held, therefore, that Childs's consent was valid.97
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 949-50.
95. Id. at 950 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 954.
97. Id.
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Prior to Childs, the Fifth Circuit laid the foundation upon which
the Seventh Circuit majority based its decision. In United States v.
Shabazz, the Fifth Circuit stated, "detention, not questioning, is the
evil at which Terry's second prong is aimed. ' 98 Officers pulled over
a vehicle for speeding. 99 While one officer performed a check on
the drivers' licenses, the other officer questioned the defendants
about their trip and eventually received consent to search the vehi-
cle.100 The search yielded narcotics. 1
At the prosecution, the defendants moved to suppress this evi-
dence as the product of an unreasonable seizure, arguing that the
officer exceeded the scope of questioning.102 The Fifth Circuit held
that the officer's questions did not create an unreasonable seizure
because they did not impermissibly extend the stop beyond the
time otherwise necessary for a routine traffic stop.10 3 The court
noted, "Mere questioning ... is neither a search nor a seizure. 104
Thus, even though the officer's questions were unrelated to the
original reason for the stop, the Fifth Circuit determined, "appel-
lants cannot complain of questioning that took place during the
pendency of a computer check. While appellants were under no
obligation to answer the questions, the Constitution does not for-
bid law enforcement officers from asking. 10 5 Under Shabazz, the
Fifth Circuit plainly considers length of detention as the crux upon
which to judge the reasonableness of a routine traffic stop.10 6
In contrast to the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, the Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits have held that questions are seizures that re-
quire either some relation to the original reason for the stop or an
independent source of reasonable suspicion107 For example, in
98. 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993).
99. Id. at 433.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 434.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 437.
104. Id. at 436.
105. Id. at 437.
106. Id. New Jersey followed the Shabazz reasoning. See State v. Pegeese, 796
A.2d 934, 937 (N.J. 2002):
[W]e conclude that the continued detention of the driver and defendant by
the troopers while they waited for the results of the registration and license
checks was permissible, and their brief questioning concerning the recent
whereabouts of the occupants during the short wait for these results did not
violate either the state or federal constitutions.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ra-
mos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163-64 (8th Cir. 1994).
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United States v. Ramos the Eighth Circuit held that an officer com-
mitted an unreasonable seizure when he asked suspects questions
that exceeded the scope of the original justification for the stop. 08
A police officer pulled over a vehicle because one of the occupants
was not wearing a seatbelt.'0 9 The officer performed a routine traf-
fic stop and after returning the defendants' licenses, detained the
defendants to ask them questions about guns and drugs.110 The
defendants denied possession of either and granted the officer con-
sent to search the vehicle. 1 ' The search produced over 150 pounds
of marijuana.'1 2
The defendants moved to suppress the marijuana evidence be-
cause, they argued, the scope of the officer's questioning was not
reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the stop. 113
The district court denied the motion to suppress the evidence on
grounds that the officer had an objective basis under Terry to ex-
pand the scope of questioning." 4
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, did not believe
that the officer had an objective basis to expand the questioning,
holding:
If, however, no answers are inconsistent and no objective cir-
cumstances supply the trooper with additional suspicion, the
trooper should not expand the scope of the stop.
In the present case, for reasons we have explained, we believe
that continuing to detain the defendants after their licenses and
registration had been checked was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.'15
Accordingly, because the defendants provided consistent answers
and because their behavior accorded with innocence, the court
held that the officer impermissibly seized the defendants.1 1 6 Thus,
the Eighth Circuit plainly requires reasonable suspicion to justify
108. See Ramos, 42 F.3d at 1164.
109. Id. at 1161.
110. Id. at 1161-62.
111. Id. at 1162.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1163-64 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 1164.
1930
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expanding the scope of questioning beyond the original reason for
the stop. 117
Similarly, in United States v. Murillo the Ninth Circuit held,
"During a traffic stop, a police officer is allowed to ask questions
that are reasonably related in scope to the justification for his initia-
tion of contact.""' 8 An officer pulled over a vehicle for tailgat-
ing. 1 9 The driver exhibited extreme nervousness, so the officer
asked him questions about drugs and alcohol.1 20 The driver even-
tually consented to a search of the vehicle, which turned up narcot-
ics. 12 1 In the prosecution for possession of narcotics, the defendant
moved to suppress the evidence on grounds that the officer ex-
ceeded the scope of questioning for the original reason for the
stop-tailgating. 22
The court stated that if an officer wants to broaden the scope of
questioning, the officer "must articulate suspicious factors that are
particularized and objective.' 12  Only after the officer provided a
good number of these "suspicious factors" during his testimony did
the court conclude he had reasonable suspicion to broaden the
questioning. 24 Under this case, the Ninth Circuit plainly considers
117. See, e.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 2001) ("If the
investigatory stop is not justified by reasonable suspicion or if the investigating of-
ficers exceed the stop's proper scope, any evidence derived from the stop is inadmissi-
ble at trial."); United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 926 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Generally, an
investigative detention must remain within the scope of the traffic stop to be reasona-
ble."). See generally United States v. Duenas-Rosales, No. 8: 02CR54, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17171, at *6 (Neb. Aug. 5, 2002) ("The scope of an officer's questioning during
a traffic stop is limited to circumstances that justified the stop initially.").
118. See United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added). Among the factors the court required to broaden the scope of questioning
were:
[E]xtreme nervousness, distinct lack of eye contact at crucial moments in
their conversation, inability to explain his travel plans, elevated heart rate,
and evidence of a long road trip in a short time frame in a rental car. It is
well established that the district court should consider the totality of the cir-
cumstances to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, including the
officer's 'special training in narcotics surveillance and apprehension.'
Id. (citation omitted).
119. Id. at 1172.
120. Id. at 1172-73.
121. Id. at 1173.
122. Id. at 1174.
123. Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Baron, 94 F.3d 1312, 1319 (9th
Cir. 1996) ("Questions asked during an investigative stop must be 'reasonably related
in scope to the justification for their initiation.' An officer may broaden his or her
line of questioning if he or she notices additional suspicious factors, but these factors
must be 'particularized' and 'objective."' (quoting United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510
(9th Cir. 1994))).
124. Murillo, 255 F.3d at 1174.
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questions outside the scope of the original reason for the stop to
give rise to unreasonable seizures unless reasonable suspicion sup-
ports the questions. 125
Following this reasoning, in United States v. Holt, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reached a somewhat obfuscating conclusion. 126 The officer in
this case pulled over the defendant because he was driving without
a seatbelt. 127 While the officer was writing the citation for the
seatbelt violation, he asked the defendant whether there were any
guns or narcotics in the vehicle.1 28 The defendant stated that there
was a loaded pistol in the car.129 The officer subsequently asked
for consent to search the vehicle and discovered narcotics.
30
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the pistol and
the narcotics because the officer, he claimed, exceeded the scope of
permissible questioning.' 3' The district court determined that al-
though the officer asked the questions while writing the citation,
the questioning formed an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment because it exceeded the scope of the original justifica-
tion for the stop.132 Moreover, the court stated, reasonable suspi-
cion did not support the extension of questioning.133
Nevertheless, the en banc Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court's suppression orders, vacated the panel de-
cision, and remanded the case for further proceedings.3 The
Tenth Circuit determined that during a routine traffic stop, a police
officer may question the driver about the presence of loaded weap-
ons, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion of the existence of
such firearms. 135
While the court justified this line of questioning in the name of
police safety, it did not address whether questions not pertaining to
police safety would be permissible.'3 6 Despite avoiding the ques-
tion, the court hinted that such questioning may remain impermis-
sible because of a scope limitation, stating, "[e]ven if we were to
abandon Terry for this type of traffic stop, we are convinced we
125. Id.
126. 264 F.3d 1215, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2001).
127. Id. at 1218.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 121.8-19.
131. Id. at 1219.
132. See United States v. Holt, 229 F.3d 931, 936-39 (10th Cir. 2000).
133. Id.
134. See Holt, 264 F.3d at 1215.
135. Id. at 1217.
136. Id. at 1226-27.
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would still apply a scope requirement since, as indicated by the Su-
preme Court, the Fourth Amendment constrains the scope of all
searches and seizures. ' 137 Thus, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits hold that police questioning during a routine traffic stop must
be limited in scope to the original justification for the stop, unless
supported by reasonable suspicion.
In sum, this circuit split centers on whether police questioning
outside the scope of the original justification for the traffic stop
gives rise to an impermissible seizure. For the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits, questioning that falls outside the scope is permissible as
long as the questioning does not prolong the stop.1 38 Other deci-
sions support this view.1 39  Crystallizing the analysis in United
States v. Crain, the Fifth Circuit held officers' questions were justi-
fied because they did not extend the duration of the stop.' The
Fifth Circuit noted, "this Circuit holds that mere police questioning
does not constitute a seizure. Further, when questioning takes
place while officers are waiting for the results of a computer
check-and therefore does not extend the duration of the stop-
the questioning does not violate Terry."''
137. Id. at 1230; see also United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.
1988), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 785
(10th Cir. 1995).
An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license
and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. When
the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to oper-
ate the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject
to further delay by police for additional questioning.
Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519 (citations omitted).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952 (7th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437-38 (5th Cir. 1993).
139. See United States v. Davis, 61 F.3d 291, 300 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that ques-
tions outside the scope did not create an impermissible seizure because the defendant
was detained no longer than the usual time necessary to issue a speeding ticket);
United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Sanders, 846
F. Supp. 42, 45 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (holding that officers may question suspects on mat-
ters wholly unrelated to the original reason for the stop without violating the Fourth
Amendment); Edmond v. State, No. 14-01-00386-CR, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 2486, at
*10 (Apr. 4, 2002) ("Our holding is consistent with prior decisions like Shabazz,
which identify the duration of detention as the key determinate of reasonableness
under Terry and its progeny. Because we have already established appellant's deten-
tion was not unreasonably prolonged in this case, questioning appellant regarding
drugs was permissible.").
140. See Crain, 33 F.3d at 485.
141. Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
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In contrast, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits prefer a bright-
line approach, 142 which does not permit the questioning to exceed
the scope of the original reason for the stop.143 Other decisions
support this view as well, but with an underlying attention paid to
the actual length of the detention instead of questioning.' 44
In United States v. Rodriguez-Diaz, the District of Maryland held
that an officer violated the Fourth Amendment when he asked the
defendant questions unrelated to the original reason for the stop-
a seatbelt violation. 145 The court determined, "Officer Shull's deci-
sion to ignore the seat belt violation he had observed committed by
the front seat passenger and to proceed, instead, to conduct an in-
vestigation into the lawfulness of defendant's possession and oper-
ation of the vehicle, unreasonably prolonged the defendant's
detention."1 46
And so, although the circuits sharply conflict on the issue and
may draw support for their views from other decisions, the Su-
preme Court has not yet definitively ruled on it. The closest the
Court has come to addressing the issue was with its decision in
Ohio v. Robinette.147
B. The Supreme Court and Robinette
In Robinette, a police officer stopped a driver for speeding. 48
The officer performed a routine license and registration check, but
before letting the driver leave, he asked, "One question before you
get gone: Are you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any
142. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court disfavors bright-line ap-
proaches to Fourth Amendment issues and instead prefers a balancing test. See Ohio
v. Robionette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
143. See, e.g, United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d
1160, 1161 (8th Cir. 1994).
144. See United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that
officer committed unreasonable seizure by detaining suspect after original reason for
the routine traffic stop); United States v. Rodriguez-Diaz, 161 F. Supp. 2d 627, 628
(D. Md. 2001).
145. Rodriguez-Diaz, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 633.
146. Id.; see also State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 908 (N.J. 2002).
Because the motorist cannot leave the area before the search is completed,
unless it is terminated earlier, the detention associated with roadside
searches is unlike a 'mere field interrogation' where an officer may question
an individual 'without grounds for suspicion.' Roadside consent searches are
instead more akin to an investigatory [stop] that does involve a detention.
Such a stop traditionally has required reasonable and articulable suspicion.
Carty, 790 A.2d at 908 (citations omitted).
147. 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
148. Id. at 35.
1934
2003] QUESTIONING DURING TRAFFIC STOPS
weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?"'14 9 The driver
said, "No," and then the officer asked for and received consent to
search the vehicle. 150 The search turned up marijuana and other
narcotics. 151
The defendant moved to suppress this evidence at the prosecu-
tion for possession. 15 2 The lower court denied the suppression mo-
tion, but the appellate court reversed and the Supreme Court of
Ohio affirmed the reversal. 153 The Supreme Court of Ohio held
that after the officer, "had determined in his own mind not to give
Robinette a ticket, the detention then became unlawful.' 54 The
court held that officers must inform suspects of their right to refuse
to consent.155
The Supreme Court reviewed the issue, noting that reasonable-
ness is the "touchstone" of the Fourth Amendment and that rea-
sonableness is measured by "examining the totality of the
circumstances.' 56 Citing Bostick, the Court stated that it has "con-
sistently eschewed bright-line rules" in Fourth Amendment
cases.' 57 Accordingly, the Court reversed the Ohio Supreme Court
and remanded for further proceedings.' 58
The Seventh Circuit applied Robinette to reach its decision in
Childs. As in Robinette, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Fourth
Amendment requires reasonableness. 59  Along these lines, the
court determined that questions, although outside the scope of the
original justification for the stop-that do not create any inconve-
nience-do not cause a reasonable stop to become unreasona-
ble.' 61 The Childs court went on to state: "Any doubt about this
149. Id. at 35-36.
150. Id. at 36.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 36-37.
154. Id. at 38.
155. Id. at 36.
156. Id. at 39.
157. Id. at 39 ("And again, in Florida v. Bostick, when the Florida Supreme Court
adopted a per se rule that questioning aboard a bus always constitutes a seizure, we
reversed, reiterating that the proper inquiry necessitates a consideration of 'all the
circumstances surrounding the encounter.'" (citations omitted)).
158. Id. at 40.
159. United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 2002).
160. Id.
Questions that hold potential for detecting crime, yet create little or no in-
convenience, do not turn reasonable detention into unreasonable detention.
They do not signal or facilitate oppressive police tactics that may burden the
public - for all suspects (even the guilty ones) may protect themselves fully
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understanding of questions during traffic stops is dispelled by Ohio
v. Robinette."' 6' The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because the
Supreme Court rejected Ohio's bright-line rule that an officer must
advise a suspect that he is free to leave before proceeding with
further questions, it "necessarily rejected the broader contention
that unrelated questions may not be asked at all."''
62
Although the Supreme Court reached its Robinette decision by
an eight-to-one margin, the dissent merits consideration. In dis-
sent, Justice Stevens was troubled by the timing of the questioning
because it occurred after the routine traffic stop had come to an
end and was outside the scope of the original reason for the stop.163
[B]y the time Robinette was asked for consent to search his au-
tomobile, the lawful traffic stop had come to an end; Robinette
had been given his warning, and the speeding violation provided
no further justification for detention. The continued detention
was therefore only justifiable, if at all, on some other grounds.1 64
Justice Stevens argued that because no articulable facts gave rise to
reasonable suspicion of separate criminal activity, the officer's con-
tinued detention of the suspect created an impermissible seizure. 165
Thus, while Justice Stevens expressed concern about the possibil-
ity of an impermissible seizure, the majority's lack of concern for
this possibility, according to the Seventh Circuit, leads to the con-
clusion that the Court rejected the idea that unrelated questions
may not be asked at all. 166
Nevertheless, some scholars contend that Robinette does not at
all address the issue of whether an officer may expand the scope of
questioning beyond the original justification for the stop. 167 Ac-
cording to one scholar, "the core issue raised by the Robinette facts
remains undecided by the U.S. Supreme Court: following a routine
traffic stop, does law enforcement's non-traffic related questioning
of a motorist, including a request to search, amount to a Fourth
by declining to answer. Nor do the questions forcibly invade any privacy
interest or extract information without the suspects' consent.
Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Id.
166. See Childs, 277 F. 3d at 954.
167. See e.g., Whorf, supra note 11, at 13; see also George M. Dery III, "When Will
This Traffic Stop End?": The United States Supreme Court's Dodge of Every Detained
Motorist's Central Concern - Ohio v. Robinette, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 519, 519
(1998).
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Amendment 'seizure' of that person?"' 168 This scholar asserts that
no reasonable person in Robinette's position would have felt free
to leave under the circumstances. 169 Therefore, because the of-
ficer's questions exceeded the scope of the original justification for
the stop, the questions created an impermissible seizure. 170 De-
spite his opinion, this scholar agrees with the Seventh Circuit's
reading of the Robinette decision: "The routine traffic stop turned
consent search, as far as U.S. Supreme Court rulings go, remains a
viable drug interdiction technique. "171
Another scholar has taken it upon himself to address the issue in
Robinette directly.172 He argues that the Court failed to address
Robinette's core issue as well, but contends that if the Court ad-
hered to some of its earlier reasoning it would have determined
that Robinette was impermissibly seized. He notes:
The first relevant fact is the prior existence of a seizure of Robi-
nette's person. The very fact of a pre-existing seizure enhanced
the police dominance of the situation, and, therefore, increased
the potency of all the other factors pointing toward the restric-
tion of Robinette's liberty. Not only was Robinette stopped, he
had been advised by an officer in a marked patrol cruiser that
the officer observed him violate the law. 173
Thus, under a totality of the circumstances analysis, involving the
seamless transition from a legal seizure based on a routine traffic
stop to a consent search and police dominion over the scene, of-
ficers impermissibly seized Robinette. 174
Nevertheless, as the Robinette decision shows, the Court has con-
sistently weighed the balance in favor of law enforcement over pri-
vacy interests in this area of the law. 175 Accordingly, Robinette
168. Whorf, supra note 11, at 13.
169. See id. at 14.
Those circumstances included commencement of the encounter through a
dramatic show of authority (namely, a closely following police car with flash-
ing lights) effectuating the initial seizure of the vehicle and its occupants; and
a continuing seizure of the motorist through a demand for driver's docu-
ments, a time lapse for a warrant check, and the issuance of a citation or
warning (all of this occurring while the motorist is detained, more often than
not, in the din of a high-speed roadway).
Id.
170. See id. at 14-15.
171. Id. at 16.
172. See Dery, supra note 167, at 555.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 555-62.
175. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996); Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
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supports the Childs holding. 176 The Seventh Circuit explained how
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Robinette applies to Childs:
Robinettethus approves exactly what Childs says may not occur:
Questions during a routine traffic stop that do not concern the
purpose of the stop (and are not supported by any other suspi-
cion), yet extend the stop's duration .... By rejecting the posi-
tion of the state court in Robinette, the Supreme Court of the
United States necessarily rejected the broader contention that
unrelated questions may not be asked at all. 7 7
Thus, as Childs makes plain, Robinette's precedential effect is to
support the proposition that questions unrelated to the original
reason for a traffic stop do not necessarily constitute an unreasona-
ble seizure. 178
C. Effective Police Strategy v. Fourth Amendment Rights
A significant undertone to the seizure issue is the balance be-
tween the state's interest in enforcing its laws and a person's pri-
vacy interest.17 9 This balance usually tilts in favor of the person's
privacy interest. 180 Nevertheless, courts remain mindful of exces-
sive limitations on effective police work.'
The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is
among the most sacred. 82 But often, seizures may involve a lim-
ited detention, less intrusive than a formal arrest.183 Under this
scenario, in Brown v. Texas, the Court pointed out that courts must
determine the reasonableness of the seizure by balancing between,
"the public interest and the individual's right to personal security
free from arbitrary interference by law officers. 184
Courts employ this balance to avoid arbitrary invasions on a per-
son's privacy interest at the sole discretion of a police officer.1 85
176. Compare Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40, with United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d
947, 954 (7th Cir. 2002).
177. Childs, 277 F.3d at 954.
178. Id.
179. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
180. See id. at 52.
181. See id. at 51.
182. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
183. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50.
184. Id. at 50 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)) (noting
that a court must weigh the "gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the inter-
ference with individual liberty.").
185. Id. at 51.
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Accordingly, the Brown Court noted, "[T]he Fourth Amendment
requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts
indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of
the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers.
186
i. The Privacy Interest Argument
Weighing this balance, the privacy interest argument maintains
that when officers ask questions outside the scope of the original
reason for the routine traffic stop, they impermissibly intrude upon
the person's Fourth Amendment rights.187 Under this view, when
the officer's questions stray from the original reason for the stop
and eventually lead to consent to search the vehicle, the officer
severely interferes with the driver's dignitary interests. One
scholar notes the severity of the intrusion upon a person's dignitary
interests:
Therefore, during the delay by the roadside, the vehicle's occu-
pants, young and old, will wait by the side of the highway (or,
occasionally, in the police cruiser). The wait may occur at any
hour, in any weather, with cars and trucks roaring by. The wait
by the side of the highway occurs in conditions resembling a sort
of sterile and impersonal gauntlet of speeding vehicles where
the din and air turbulence add to the unsettling surreality of the
surrounding. Disorienting would, at a minimum, be a fair
description of the effect on people in this setting. Motorists and
their passengers have additionally described their 'fear, anger
and humiliation' arising from standing at the side of the highway
during a routine traffic stop turned consent search.' 88
Because questions outside the scope of the original reason for
the routine traffic stop confuse the driver's expectations as to what
may occur during a stop, the questions become an enormous intru-
sion on the driver's dignitary interests.189 The Tenth Circuit noted,
"[M]otorists ordinarily expect to be allowed to continue on their
186. Id.
187. Cf Whorf, supra note 11.
188. Id. at 19.
189. See id. at 18.
After the routine traffic stop has occurred, the degree to which it is intimi-
dating may be minimized by two factors according to the U.S. Supreme
Court. First, the motorist likely presumes that the stop will be temporary
and brief. It is likely to last long enough for police to collect and check
driver's documents and to write a citation or issue a warning. Second, the
stop takes place in the public view of passers-by. For the motorist who de-
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way once the purposes of a stop are met. The government's gen-
eral interest in criminal investigation, without more, is generally
insufficient to outweigh the individual interest in ending the
detention." 19
The previously mentioned scholar further states that the phe-
nomena of the routine traffic stop turned consent search for drug
interdiction purposes occurs frequently, thus expanding the intru-
sion on privacy and dignitary concerns. 19' Another scholar argues
that "government should intrude upon our privacy and security
only so much as is necessary for it to do its job. 1 192
ii. The Law Enforcement Argument
On the other side of the balance, the law enforcement argument
avers that questioning beyond the scope of the original reason for
the stop serves a strong state interest-drug interdiction.1 93 Under
this view, the state's interest in expanding the questioning plainly
clines to answer questions, the public nature of the encounter reduces the
motorist's fear of abuse by police.
However, in the context of the routine traffic stop turned consent search,
neither of these factors has the effect of minimizing the enormous intrusion
of the encounter.
Id.
190. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
191. See Whorf, supra note 11, at 18-21.
Other evidence also supports the proposition that the routine traffic stop
turned consent search occurs with great frequency. In 1992, the Orlando
Sentinel obtained videotapes of over one thousand typical routine traffic
stops, conducted on Interstate 95 by the Sheriff's Department in Volusia
County, Florida, in which officers sought consent to search. Further north
on Interstate 95, even in the nation's smallest state, reports of drug seizures
from the routine traffic stop turned consent search are common. In Robi-
nette itself, one member of the Court noted that 'Ohio's courts observed that
traffic stops in the State were regularly giving way to contraband searches.'
In fact, the officer who conducted the routine traffic stop turned consent
search of Robinette had testified at one suppression hearing that he re-
quested consent to search in 786 traffic stops in a single year. Since all but a
few of such requests are invariably granted, even from motorists who are
carrying contraband, the 786 requests undoubtedly resulted in almost the
same number of searches.
Id. (citations omitted)
192. Dery, supra note 167, at 567.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 2002).
Officers ask persons stopped for traffic offenses whether they are commit-
ting any other crimes. That is not an unreasonable law-enforcement strat-
egy, either in a given case or in gross; persons who do not like the question
can decline to answer. Unlike many other methods of enforcing the criminal
law, this respects everyone's privacy.
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outweighs the seemingly insignificant privacy interest in not being
asked these questions. 94 Furthermore, questioning of this nature
does not create an impermissible stop and thereby trigger Fourth
Amendment protection because the questions add nothing to the
length of the stop.'95 The Fourth Amendment does not ban police
questioning; it guards against unreasonable detentions.'
96
In cases involving this similar balance, the Supreme Court has
weighed the balance in favor of a state's interest in enforcing its
laws.' 97 For example, in Whren v. United States, the Court deter-
mined that an officer's subjective intentions did not make a sus-
pect's continued detention illegal, as long as objective
circumstances justified the detention.1 98 And, in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, the Court held that proof of a suspect's knowledge of
the right to refuse consent was not necessary for demonstrating
voluntary consent. 99 Additionally, as previously mentioned, in
Robinette the Court held that an officer did not have to tell a sus-
pect that he was free to leave after the officer wrote the citation.200
III. A NARROW SOLUTION
This Note proposes that courts should consider the Childs hold-
ing to determine whether questions outside the scope of the origi-
nal justification for the stop-that do not prolong the stop-create
impermissible seizures. The following points support application of
the Childs holding.
A. Bostick or Terry?
Courts generally employ a Terry analysis to determine whether a
seizure is unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.20 1 Nev-
ertheless, the Seventh Circuit questioned whether a Terry analysis
is appropriate for determining whether questions asked outside the
scope of the original reason for a routine traffic stop create an im-
permissible seizure.20 2 In Childs, the Seventh Circuit was per-
plexed by the assertion that a police officer may ask questions
194. See, id.
195. See United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993).
196. Id.
197. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996); Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1973).
198. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
199. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 227-28.
200. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001).
202. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 2002).
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freely of someone walking down the street and of someone in prac-
tical, although not technical custody, such as the circumstances in
Bostick. °3 Nevertheless, officers may not ask questions of some-
one in actual police custody.2 °4 Thus, employing an identical Terry
analysis to all traffic stops troubled the Seventh Circuit:
Handling all traffic stops identically is at once too demanding
and too lax. Treating checkpoint stops as if they were Terry stops
supported by reasonable suspicion gives the officers too much
discretion over drivers who arrive at roadblocks or security
screening points. Treating arrests on probable cause as if they,
too, were Terry stops gives the officers too little discretion. A
person stopped on reasonable suspicion must be released as
soon as the officers have assured themselves that no skulldug-
gery is afoot. Probable cause, by contrast, justifies a custodial
arrest and prosecution, and arrests are fundamentally different
from Terry stops. Persons who are arrested may be taken to the
station house for booking, even if the only penalty for the of-
fense is a fine (as it is for failure to wear a seat belt). In other
words, arrested persons (unlike those stopped at checkpoints, or
on reasonable suspicion) need notbe released as quickly as pos-
sible. What is more, a person stopped on probable cause may be
searched fully, while a person stopped on reasonable suspicion
may be patted down but not searched." 5
And so, putting aside the Terry catchall analysis, in the introduc-
tory situation a court may want to consider a Bostick analysis of the
situation. In Childs, as in Bostick, the defendant was not techni-
cally free to leave, but at all times he maintained the right to refuse
police questioning.0 6 The Childs court noted that questioning
outside the scope of the original reason for the routine traffic stop,
"is not an unreasonable law-enforcement strategy, either in a given
case or in gross; persons who do not like the question can decline to
answer."20 7 Hence, a Bostick analysis may be more appropriate.
Nevertheless, opponents of the Bostick analysis, for this type of
situation, argue that Bostick is entirely distinguishable from the
facts in Childs.2 °s Because Bostick affirmatively decided to travel
on the bus, he placed himself in a situation where he would not feel
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 952 (citations omitted).
206. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991).
207. See Childs, 277 F.3d at 954 (emphasis added).
208. See Whorf, supra note 11, at 15.
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free to leave.2 °9 In Childs, on the other hand, police officers cre-
ated the situation where Childs felt he was not free to leave be-
cause they legally seized him for the traffic violation.2 10 Because of
this distinction, they argue, a Terry analysis is more appropriate
than a Bostick analysis.2 1
Despite these arguments, the Bostick analysis is more appropri-
ate to determine whether questions outside the scope of the origi-
nal reason for the stop-that do not prolong the stop-create an
impermissible seizure because Bostick is more analogous to this
situation.
Opponents of the Bostick analysis for this situation fail to ad-
dress that Childs essentially created the initial seizure by dis-
obeying the traffic laws. 12 Had Childs simply fixed the windshield
and fastened his seatbelt, the officers probably never would have
pulled him over in the first place.213 Because Childs brought the
initial seizure upon himself, therefore, a Bostick analysis of
whether Childs would have felt free to decline police questioning is
more appropriate than a Terry analysis.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id.
[T]he circumstances of the routine traffic stop turned consent search make
almost impossible that which was highly unlikely anyway; namely, that any
reasonable person would feel free to ignore direct police questioning about
illegal activity, especially when police have just exerted the authority of a
forcible traffic stop and detention.
Id.; see also United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001).
We have consistently applied the principles of Terry v. Ohio, to routine traf-
fic stops. Under Terry, the reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on
'whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interfer-
ence in the first place.' Thus, we assess the reasonableness of a traffic stop
based on an observed violation by considering the scope of the officer's ac-
tions and balancing the motorist's legitimate expectation of privacy against
the government's law-enforcement-related interests.
Holt, 269 F.3d at 1220.
212. See Childs, 277 F.3d at 949.
213. Id. Note that under this analysis, the likelihood of pretextual stops may in-
crease. See Whorf, supra note 11, at 22-23 (hypothesizing that the routine traffic stop
turned consent search occurs 163,000 times annually across the nation). Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has determined that pretextual traffic stops do not necessarily
violate the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)
("Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis."). Thus, any possible increase in the likelihood of pretextual traffic stops as
a result of this analysis fails to weaken support for the analysis because the Supreme
Court has explicitly ruled that such pretextual stops do not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment. See id. Presumably, an increase in permissible pretextual stops would not re-
verse Whren.
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Further, a Bostick analysis is more reasonable than a Terry anal-
ysis under the Court's totality of the circumstances approach to
Fourth Amendment problems.21 4 Because the Court dislikes
bright-line rules in Fourth Amendment cases, 215 and because a
Terry analysis would necessarily ban all questioning outside the
scope of the original reason for the stop,216 a Bostick analysis more
accurately employs consideration of the totality of the
circumstances.217
B. Detention or Mere Questioning: Which Is It?
The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held that questions
that exceed the scope of the original reason for a routine traffic
stop create impermissible seizures unless reasonable suspicion of
independent criminal activity supports the questions.21 8 For these
circuits, questioning itself may create an impermissible seizure. On
the other hand, for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, the length of the
detention determines whether a seizure is impermissible.219 It fol-
lows that questioning itself, for these circuits, does not create an
impermissible seizure; length of time is the key component. 2 0
Thus, as noied before, the issue turns on the length of the deten-
tion for some courts, while other courts take a bright-line approach
and ban the questioning altogether.22'
Nevertheless, courts that take a bright-line approach tend to fo-
cus on the length of the detention as well.22 For example, in Ra-
mos the court held that the continued detention of the defendants
"after their licenses and registration had been checked was a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. 223 Although the court initially fo-
cused its problem on the scope of questioning, a closer reading of
214. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996).
215. See Id. at 39.
216. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-24 (1968) (noting the required scope
limitation).
217. See discussion infra Part III.C.
218. See United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160 (8th Cir.
1994).
219. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993).
220. See Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 436.
221. See supra Part I.
222. See, e.g., Holt, 264 F.3d at 1215; Ramos, 42 F.3d at 1160.
223. See Ramos, 42 F.3d at 1164.
1944
2003] QUESTIONING DURING TRAFFIC STOPS
the case shows that the underlying issue that made the seizure im-
permissible was that the questioning prolonged the detention.224
Similarly, in Holt the court focused its attention on the scope of
questioning but also addressed the detention problem, stating:
Motorists ordinarily expect to be allowed to continue on their
way once the purposes of a stop are met. The government's
general interest in criminal investigation, without more, is gen-
erally insufficient to outweigh the individual interest in ending
the detention.... Further delay is justified only if the officer has
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity or if the encounter has
become consensual. 225
Along these lines, the Childs holding addresses the detention con-
cerns and clarifies the role of questioning. By holding that an of-
ficer may ask questions unrelated to the original reason for the
stop as long as the questions do not prolong the stop, the Seventh
Circuit made clear that questions do not create impermissible
seizures by themselves.226 Accordingly, questions may only con-
tribute to an impermissible seizure by prolonging the detention.2 7
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Shabazz determined that "Mere
questioning . . . is neither a search nor a seizure. "228 The court
went on to conclude that questions outside the scope of the original
reason for the stop do not constitute an unreasonable seizure be-
cause they do not impermissibly extend the stop beyond the time
necessary for a routine traffic stop. 22 9
Thus, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits' view of the issue may be
squared with the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits' view. The Fifth
and Seventh Circuits speak to the same evil as the Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits-prolonged detention.230 Because the facts in
Childs and Shabazz show that questioning outside the scope did
not prolong the detention, the only item left to create an impermis-
sible seizure would be the questioning.
But the Supreme Court consistently has held that questions are
not seizures.231 In a similar situation, therefore, because the ques-
tions do not prolong the stop and because questions are not
224. Id.
225. See Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221.
226. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 2002).
227. Id.
228. United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993).
229. Id. at 437-38.
230. Compare, e.g., Childs, 277 F.3d at 952-54, with Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 436.
231. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
210, 216-17 (1984); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
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seizures, the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits would have little
choice but to consider the Childs holding for future cases.
C. Privacy Interest v. Effective Law Enforcement
Some scholars have noted that certain police questioning may
intrude upon a person's privacy interest.232 They paint a sordid pic-
ture where the officer's questions lead to an embarrassing and
traumatic experience.233 In this example, innocent motorists stand
along the side of a vast interstate highway as other cars speed by
dangerously close.234
Nevertheless, this picture is inaccurate. As noted in Childs, mo-
torists may simply decline to answer an officer's question if it ex-
ceeds the scope of the original reason for the stop.235 As the Childs
court reasoned, if an officer freely may ask questions of someone
walking down the street and of someone in practical custody, such
as on a bus, the officer should be able to ask questions of someone
in actual custody.236 If a person feels free to decline an officer's
questioning, because the officer does not employ coercion, and if
that questioning does not prolong the stop, the officer does not
intrude upon the person's Fourth Amendment rights.237 Moreover,
because the questioning is not intolerably intrusive, the state's in-
terest in drug interdiction strongly outweighs a person's minimal
privacy interest in not being asked questions outside the scope of
the original reason for the stop, if the questions do not prolong the
stop.
238
232. See Dery, supra note 167, at 521-28 (discussing cases similar to Ohio v. Robi-
nette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996)); Whorf, supra note 11, at 16-24.
233. See Whorf, supra note 11, at 19.
234. Id.
235. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 2002).
By asking one question about marijuana, officer Chiola did not make the
custody of Childs an "unreasonable" seizure. What happened here must oc-
cur thousands of times daily across the nation: Officers ask persons stopped
for traffic offenses whether they are committing any other crimes. That is
not an unreasonable law-enforcement strategy, either in a given case or in
gross; persons who do not like the question can decline to answer. Unlike
many other methods of enforcing the criminal law, this respects everyone's
privacy.
Id.
236. Id. at 954.
237. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1991).
238. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (noting the balancing test).
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D. Childs Is Consistent With Robinette
The decision in Robinette, along with Whren and Bustamonte, in-
dicate that the Supreme Court is heading in the direction of the
Childs holding. Through Robinette, Whren, and Bustamonte, the
Court has determined that: 1) officers need not always inform sus-
pects that they are free to go before consent to search could be
deemed voluntary;23 9 2) an officer's subjective intentions do not
make continued detention illegal, as long as objective circum-
stances justify the detention; 240 and 3) proof of knowledge of the
right to refuse consent was not necessary for demonstrating volun-
tary consent. 41
In the introductory situation, therefore, the officer did not have
to tell the defendant that he was free to go after the officer wrote
the citation.242 In addition, even if the officer intended from the
outset to question the defendant about narcotics, as long as the
officer had an objective basis for stopping the defendant, this
would be fine.243 Finally, the officer would not even have to show
that the defendant knew that he had the right to refuse to
consent.244
Because the Court has consistently weighed the balance in favor
of the state's interest in this area of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, it is highly unlikely that the Court would not permit an of-
ficer to ask questions outside the original reason for the stop as
long as the questions did not prolong the stop.245
CONCLUSION
Courts should consider the Childs holding when dealing with
questions that fall outside the scope of the original reason for the
stop. Under a Bostick analysis, mere questioning does not create
an impermissible seizure. Moreover, even the courts that express
problems with the scope of questioning eventually direct their at-
tention to the length of the detention. And if length of detention is
the evil the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect against, then ques-
tions that do not prolong the detention should not create an imper-
missible seizure.
239. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996).
240. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
241. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973).
242. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40.
243. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
244. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 234.
245. See United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 954 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Further, the state interest in drug interdiction outweighs the
minimal privacy interest and the Supreme Court disfavors bright-
line rules. In addition, Childs remains consistent with the direction
of the Court in Robinette.
For the foregoing reasons, courts should consider the Childs
holding to determine whether questions that fall outside the scope
of the original reason for a routine traffic stop that do not prolong
the stop create an impermissible seizure.
